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I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer in Ft. Lauderdale convinces his wealthiest clients to invest
their money in court bonds for civil settlements that he, in fact,
fabricated.' A developer sells hundreds of vacant lots in north Florida it
2
may have never owned. From brazen Ponzi schemes, endemic
financial, consumer, and mortgage fraud, to corporate malfeasance, in
the wake of the real estate market's collapse and the Great Recession,
there has been a tremendous upsurge in financial crime investigations in
Florida and throughout the country. In every one of these cases, the
allegations of criminal conduct may be similar, if not identical, to the
elements that would support compensable civil claims. Indeed, criminal
and civil cases can often intertwine, branching from the same root set of
facts, making it difficult to discern where one legal proceeding begins
and the other ends. 4 Beyond the issues of criminal punishment or civil
redress, there are also constitutional implications which span the whole
of these proceedings that are as dynamic as they are different,
depending on the forum in which they are raised. Nowhere are these
implications more evident than with the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.
Suppose the suspect in a white collar criminal case is sued in civil
court by an alleged victim of the financial crime under investigation. He
objects to answering any questions in the civil case on the ground that it
might incriminate him in the criminal investigation. Where his refusal to
1. Warren Richey, How Scott Rothstein Rode $1.2 Billion Ponzi Scheme to Wealth and
Power, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 27, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ISA/
2010/0127/How-Scott-Rothstein-rode-1.2-billion-Ponzi-scheme-to-wealth-and-power.
2. Catherine E. Shoichet, Firm May Have Sold Land It Didn't Own, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/10/27/Citrus/Firm-may
have-sold la.shtml).
3. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Financial Crimes Report
to the Public (Fiscal Year 2009) (measuring between Oct. 1, 2008, and Sept. 30, 2009, reflecting
nearly 40% increase in pending corporate fraud cases, a 32.5% increase in pending securities
and commodities fraud cases, and a 287.5% increase in pending mortgage fraud cases); Florida
Dep't of Law Enforcement 2009-2010 Annual Performance Report, Investigations and
Forensics Services Highlights (reporting on department's investigation of $400 million
mortgage fraud case; "The investigation was launched in response to the epidemic of mortgage
fraud throughout Florida which began during the state's real estate boom earlier this decade
. . ."), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/1465a2f4-5605-431c-acda4e3d540c3fd/year-end-highlights-ifs.aspx (retrieved on Nov. 4, 2010). See also Mark Puente,
Reality Limits Real Estate Oversight, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011 (reporting on status

of 1595 cases of alleged real estate broker fraud Florida Division of Real Estate referred to state
attorneys' offices between Jan. 1, 2009 and Dec. 31, 2010), availableat http://www.tampabay.
com/news/business/realestate/articlel 151002.ece).
4. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits of Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
CriminalLaw Objectives: Understandingand Transcendingthe Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991).
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testify could not be used against him in the criminal case, it becomes
"fair game," so to speak, in the civil proceedings and can even become
the basis to impose a legal inference against him on any matter about
which he refuses to testify.5 Yet this refusal to provide testimony
adversely affects the civil plaintiff, as well. A private litigant is
empowered by the rules of civil procedure to obtain discovery from his
or her adversary regardless of whether the defendant elects to
participate in the discovery process.6 The defendant may well be the
best source of knowledge on the critical subjects of the civil case. By
exercising his Fifth Amendment right, the defendant could bar the civil
plaintiff from obtaining the most important testimony and evidence in
the lawsuit.
Given these competing considerations, should the trial court simply
stay the civil action until the criminal proceedings have run their
course? If the civil case proceeds, can the defendant ignore the
plaintiffs discovery requests or court orders that might arguably
implicate criminal testimony, and, if so, what effect should that refusal
have in adjudicating the merits of the civil case? In short, what limits
can the court impose to safeguard the defendant's right to remain silent
while assuring that the civil plaintiff s case is not unfairly hindered?
While criminal defendants, for a variety of reasons, may not
generally be expected to testify in their own defense, civil defendants
are-and their refusal to testify often results in a remarkably different,
5. See infra Part V.
6. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
7. In what may be the seminal law review article on this subject, Professor Robert Heidt
posited that a defendant's persistent refusal to provide evidence or testimony in a civil case
"precludes discovery and frustrates the truth-determining capacity of the litigation process to an
alarming extent" to the point that the plaintiffs case may suffer from a "failure of proof' that
could result in outright dismissal of the claims. See Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The
Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1135, 1081 (1982). That may be
something of an overstatement (the only example given of such a proof failure is a hypothetical
price-fixing conspiracy where no documents or testimony could possibly be obtained from any
independent sources), but the other impediments imposed on civil plaintiffs--delay, increased
litigation costs, possible gamesmanship in the timing of the right's assertion-are all, without
argument, real and considerable. Id.
8. See Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules
that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CiN. L. REv. 851 (2008) ("A large percentage of
criminal defendants decline to testify, forcing juries to decide the question of the defendant's
guilt without ever hearing from the person most knowledgeable on the subject."); Theodore
Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of PriorCriminal
Record on the Decision to Testify, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1353, 1389 (2009) (concluding that
evidence of bias in cases where criminal defendants had prior convictions may suggest "the
value of exploring the development of legal rules that encourage defendants, even those with
criminal records, to testify."); Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the
Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Remain Silent, 35 IND. L. REv. 925
(2002).

4

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 22

even hostile, juridical response compared to that which a criminal
defendant's refusal would elicit under the same set of facts. The
distinction in treatment between civil and criminal proceedings is not
simply the byproduct of an individual asserting the Fifth Amendment
right in a forum where that right is not as frequently invoked. It is also
the result of who the other party is in most civil disputes. Unlike the
government in criminal proceedings, private civil plaintiffs have their
own constitutional rights, such as the right to access and use the
courts-rights that may be thwarted the moment a defendant utters the
Fifth Amendment's invocation.9 How, then, does a civil court make
enough room for one party's right against self-incrimination without
infringing upon the other litigant's right to use the court?
This Article will attempt to highlight some of the more notable
rulings that have arisen when Florida courts have grappled with these
conflicting interests, and, it is hoped, trace a theme of competing
constitutional rights that underlies them. First, a brief overview of the
history and development of the right to remain silent and the right of
access to courts will be considered. The focus will then turn to three
particularly relevant and litigated issues that confront trial courts when a
civil litigant asserts his or her Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
testify: (i) whether to stay the civil lawsuit prior to the completion of
parallel criminal proceedings; (ii) how to weigh discovery disputes and
access to information against a party's Fifth Amendment privilege; and
(iii) what substantive effect, if any, a litigant's refusal to testify has on
the outcome of the civil proceedings. The decisions arising from the
cases examined will illustrate the point that when a civil court confronts
a party's invocation of the right to remain silent, it is not just defining
the boundaries of one individual's constitutional protection under the
9. Heidt's article also touched upon this point, noting it as a potential source of conflict
in civil cases: "[D]efendants' full exploitation of this constitutional privilege [against selfincrimination] may deny plaintiffs any opportunity for meaningful access to the courts, an
opportunity that is itself becoming a right worthy of constitutional status." See Heidt, supra note
7, at 1082. That a potential conflict could exist between the right to remain silent and the right of
court access is a subject that has, thus far, generated relatively little judicial attention. Cf Fed.
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 566 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The district court in a
civil case so crippled by the [F]ifth [A]mendment as this one, must balance the defendants'
rights not to incriminate themselves against the plaintiffs right to a meaningful remedy.");
Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (reviewing parameters of civil stay, fact
that defendant had been indicted could not by itself justify a stay because "[t]he overall interest
of the courts . . . may very well require that the compensation and remedy due a civil plaintiff
should not be delayed (and possibly denied)."); Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249,
262 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing conflict of interest arising when a stay is requested: "A
plaintiff has a right to a trial [citing the provision of the Louisiana Constitution that provides for
a right of access] . . . . The court must weigh the civil plaintiffs constitutional right to be

compensated without unreasonable delay against the criminal defendant's rights under the Fifth
Amendment.").
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Fifth Amendment; the court is actually balancing conflicting
constitutional rights between two parties. One party's constitutional
right to remain silent may well determine another's constitutional right
to be heard in civil court-or vice versa.

II. THE Two RIGHTS IN REVIEW
A. The Right to Refuse to Testify
An individual's right to remain silent and refuse to give selfincriminating testimony is one that arguablr traces its origins to
Talmudic law in the ancient Rabbinical courts. o The right took root in
ecclesiastical jurisprudence under the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum
prodere [No one is bound to betray himsel],l from which it would later
grow and develop-albeit unsteadily-in the courts of England.12 As
the faith of Britain's sovereigns oscillated between the Church of Rome
and the Church of England throughout the seventeenth century, the
privilege gradually developed "in response to practices that were
troubling in large part because of the crimes being prosecuted-crimes
of religious belief or political expression."' 3
Whatever its precise point of origin, the privilege to be free from
incriminating oneself is a right that has resonated deeply down through
the ages. Justice Fortas cast it in a spiritual light:
The fundamental value that the privilege reflects is intangible, it
is true; but so is liberty, and so is man's immortal soul. A man
may be punished, even put to death, by the state; but . . . he

should not be made to prostrate himself before its majesty. Mea
culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a plea that cannot be
exacted from free men by human authority. To require it is to
insist that the state is the superior of the individuals who compose
it, instead of their instrument.' 4

10. See Moses v. Allard, 779 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (comparing N. Lamm, The
Fifth Amendment and its Equivalent in Jewish Law, 17 DECALOGUE 1, 12 (1967), with L. LEVY,
ORIGIN OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 439-41 (2d ed. 1986)).

11. "No one is bound to betray himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of
the European lus Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1990); Steven Penney, Theories of
Confession Admissibility: A HistoricalView, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309 (1998).
13. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 411-12 (1995).
14. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 J. CLEV. B.
Ass'N, 91, 99-100 (1954). See also Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) ("The roots of
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The right against self-incrimination came to be enshrined within the
U.S. Constitution, not as a free-standing provision of the original
enactment, but rather as one of several clauses strung together in the
middle of a subsequent amendment.' 5 Nestled between the Double
Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the right against self-incrimination appears: "nor shall any
person .

.

. be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against

himself"' 6 The Florida Constitution contains a nearly identical
expression of the right to refuse to testify in its Declaration of Rights:
"No personal shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a

witness against oneself."' 7
When invoked, this right is practically sacrosanct throughout the
course of criminal proceedings: persons taken into custody must be
informed that they have the right to remain silent;' the right can be
exercised, to its fullest extent, by "even the most feeble attempt" at
claiming it;' 9 once the right is claimed, police interrogation of a suspect

the privilege . . . tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege
reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and-in a philosophical senseinsists upon the equality of the individual and the state.").
15. See Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth or Consequences: The
Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 515 (1997) (recounting its passage as part of the Bill of
Rights submitted by James Madison shortly after President Washington's inauguration). It has
been suggested that Madison deliberately drafted the Fifth Amendment as a loosely related
bundling of rights to ensure passage of the less popularly recognized right of just compensation
found in the Takings Clause. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 77-78 (1998).

16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The protections provided under the Fifth Amendment apply
to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S
420, 428 (1984).
17. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9. For the sake of convenience only, the remainder of this Article
will use the term "Fifth Amendment" broadly to refer to both the federal and state constitutional
protections of the right to refuse to testify, as that is the term more common in general usage and
in the jurisprudence covered by this Article's topic. Cf Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160
(Fla. 2007) (noting that Florida's constitutional right is "mirrored" in the Fifth Amendment);
City of Hollywood v. Washington, 384 So. 2d 1315, 1318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (comparing
state and federal privileges against self-incrimination, stating "For the most part, Florida cases
fall in line with the federal cases . . . ."). That is not meant to diminish, in any way, the
distinctions that have arisen in criminal cases where courts have analyzed the scope of the state
constitutional protection differently than its federal counterpart. Cuervo, 967 So. 2d at 168 (Bell,
J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's opinion departs from federal standard regarding police
interrogation after suspect asserts his or her Fifth Amendment right); Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d
221, 241 (Fla. 2009) ("the federal Constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling, and this Court
retains the ability to interpret the right against self-incrimination afforded by the Florida
Constitution more broadly than that afforded by its federal counterpart.").
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-68 (1966).
19. United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955)).
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must immediately cease;20 a waiver of the right can be revoked in a later
proceeding;21 and prosecuting attorneys may not even mention to a jury
the fact that a criminal defendant has chosen to exercise his or her right
to refuse to testify. 22 The courts have afforded the Fifth Amendment an
extraordinarily liberal construction in criminal cases, 23 mindful of the
atrocities its absence historically fostered.2 4
The right also serves utilitarian functions within the criminal justice
process, as well. First, it acts as a safeguard "to assure that admissions
or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere
fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth."2 5
The right to remain silent also protects "the innocent but inarticulate"
defendant from wrongful conviction by a skilled prosecutor,26 further
ensuring the integrity of the truth-seeking process in criminal cases.
Although its text speaks in terms of incrimination, the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent includes an ambit of protection from
the threat of certain non-criminal penalties, as well.2 7 Our law
recognizes that involuntary incarceration is not the only means of
compelling incriminating testimony from a person. 28 The government
may not levy fines or taxes against an individual in such a way that
would effectively compel self-incriminating testimony. 29 One can also
refuse to testify where the governmental threat is the revocation of an
administrative or professional license or the termination of public
employment.30 In such cases, the courts have reasoned that the specter
20. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979); Miranda,384 U.S. at 473-74.
21. In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1961).
22. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); FLA. R. CluM. P. 3.250.
23. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956); United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d
226, 229 (1st Cir. 1997).
24. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-96 (1990) ("At its core, the privilege
reflects our fierce 'unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt,' [] that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein
suspects were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private thoughts and forsaking
their oath by committing perjury.") (citation omitted, quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S.
201, 212 (1988)).
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
26. AMAR, supra note 15, at 116.
27. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
28. See, e.g., Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531-34 (1963) (single mother confessed to
selling drugs during interrogation when police repeatedly told her she would lose custody of
both her children); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 553 (1956) (city
college professor's employment summarily terminated because of his prior assertion of Fifth
Amendment right during McCarthy hearings).
29. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51, 60-61 (1968); Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62, 66-67 (1968).
30. See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1967) (reversing disbarment that was
based on lawyer's refusal to surrender financial documents or to testify); In re Shearer, 377 So.
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of losing one's livelihood or professional status is indeed as powerful an
instrument of compulsion as "the use of legal process to force from the
lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict
him ..."
Nor is the right to remain silent dependent upon the forum in which
it is raised, be it civil, administrative, or criminal; 32 its protections are
not relegated to one particular division within a courthouse:
Denomination of a particular proceeding as either "civil" or
"criminal" is not a talismanic exercise, but rather attaches "labels
of convenience," and tends to inhibit factual inquiry into the
nature of the proceeding itself. The Supreme Court has
determined that the "sole concern (of the self-incrimination
clause) is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness
forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties
affixed to criminal acts . .."33

Nevertheless, a distinction does exist between penal proceedings and
those that are merely remedial in nature. 34 In the latter, the right may be
deemed inapposite because such cases often do not feature the principal
actor that looms largest in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence: the
government, as a litigant, exerting some form of pressure, or

2d 970 (Fla. 1979) (dismissing Judicial Qualifications Commission's disciplinary proceeding
against judge who had refused to testify in response to police investigation regarding car
accident); State ex rel. Vining v. Fla. Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487, 492-93 (Fla. 1973)
(real estate commission prohibited from revoking broker's license because broker refused to
answer questions after asserting Fifth Amendment right); United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d
1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002) ("a public employee may not be coerced into surrendering his
[F]ifth [A]mendment privilege by threat of being fired or subjected to other sanctions."); Best
Pool & Spa Serv. Co. v. Romanik, 622 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (pool maintenance
contractor not required to answer interrogatories regarding insurance coverage because of
potential county license infraction); McDonald v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Pilot
Comm'rs, 582 So. 2d 660, 662 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("Because license revocation or
suspension proceedings are penal in nature, the [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent
applies.").
31. Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516.
32. See infra note 34; William M. Acker, Jr., United States v. Handley: A New Direction
in Fifth Amendment Jurisprudencein the Eleventh Circuit, or an Aberration?, 44 ALA. L. REV.
143, 143-45 (1992).
33. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted); Slochower v. Bd.
of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 553 (1956). See also State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71
So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla. 1954) (The privilege "applies to all types of proceedings wherein
testimony is given and applies alike to a witness as well as a party. . .").
34. Daley, 549 F.2d at 475. See also State, ex rel. Mitchell, 71 So. 2d at 889 ("It should
be noted that ordinarily the privilege does not protect from the revealing of facts concerning a
civil liability. . . .").
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compulsion, to obtain potentially incriminating testimony. 35 In most
civil cases, the right's antagonist is not a unit or office of government,
but a private party, on more or less equal footing as the one claiming the
right, asking nothing more than to use a court for redress of an alleged
wrong.
B. The Right ofAccess to the Courts
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury."36
Our nation's Founders spoke frequently and forcefully to the issue of
judicial access in the Declaration of Independence, charging England's
King George III with having "obstructed the Administration of Justice,
by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers,"
making judges "dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries," subjecting the
people "to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution," depriving the
people "of the benefits of Trial by Jury," and transporting them overseas
for trial of "pretended offences." The American colonists would sever
centuries of allegiance, in part, because of the British government's
failure to provide them with a native, impartial arbiter to hear their
complaints.
An individual's right of access to the courts may be nearly as
hallowed as his or her right to refuse to testify if called into court.3 But
unlike the right to remain silent, the right of citizens to seek redress in
court is not one that can be readily discerned from the text of the
Constitution; in fact, its connection to our founding document is
somewhat convoluted.39 Only by pulling together several related rights
35. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) ("As we noted in Fisher,the Fifth
Amendment protects the person asserting the privilege only from compelled selfincrimination.") (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396 (1976)).
36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
37.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10-11, 15, 20-21 (U.S. 1776).

38. William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A Historical
ReconsiderationofArticle I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 333,
341 (1997) ("In some states, [the right to seek redress] is second only to the due process clause
in importance.. . .").
39. Compare Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of
National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1477, 1485-88 (2008) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause best protects the right of access), with Carol
Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment:
Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 560 (1999) (arguing that the First Amendment's
Petition Clause offers a better basis for defining the right of access). See also Norman B. Smith,
"Shall Make No Law Abridging . . ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right
of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1153, 1154-57 (1986) (tracing the medieval history of the right to
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that are expressly stated have the courts come to construe the
Constitution to afford not only the establishment of courts to adjudicate
disputes, but the right to use them as well. In federal law, the right of
court access is really a coalescing of principles drawn from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment's Petition
Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses-an amalgam
that the Supreme Court once remarked was an admittedly unsettled
basis from which to construct a constitutional right. 40 But the right's
footing, however subtle, is no less accepted or valid. 4 1 As the Eleventh
Circuit summarized the right:
Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in
the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.
To pass constitutional muster, access to the courts must be more
than merely formal; it must also be adequate, effective, and
meaningful. 2
In Florida law, as in many other states, the right has a far more direct
expression within the constitution. 43 Dating back to its 1838 enactment,
the Florida Constitution has historically included an explicit right of
access to courts in words that leave no room to doubt its prominence or
its pedigree." The right is separately enumerated in the constitution's
declaration of rights and is worded cogently: "The courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."4A In essence, this
petition in England and noting that proposed parliamentary laws, "just like individual
grievances, were presented in the form of petitions to the king.").
40. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002).
41. See id. at 415. See also David C. Hawkins, FloridaConstitutionalLaw: A Ten-Year
Retrospective on the State Bill ofRights, 14 NOVA L. REv. 693, 807 (1990).
42. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
43. Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 525 (Fla. 2001). Notwithstanding the explicitness
and similarity in verbiage among state constitutions, the right of access to courts has been the
subject of widely divergent applications throughout the states. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the
Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1279, 1282 (1995) (noting a "total disarray over how to interpret [the right of access]"
among state courts).
44. Hawkins, supra note 41, at 807 ("An expressly declared right [of access] offers the
immediate advantage of avoiding debate over its source and the level of protection that it
deserves.").
45. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. See also Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So. 2d
260, 269 (Fla. 1991) ("This Court has an independent duty and authority as a constitutionally
coequal and coordinate branch of the government of the State of Florida to guarantee the rights
of the people to have access to a functioning and efficient judicial system.").

2011]

BALANCE OF SILENCE: WEIGHING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

11I

declaration affords Floridians a fundamental right "to go to court to
resolve our disputes."46 Like the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
testify, the state constitutional right of access to courts is construed
liberally. 47 It hearkens to basic principles of equity, as one court held,
by bringing "life and vitality to the maxim: 'For every wrong there is a
remedy."
While the Fifth Amendment's protection is tethered to the threat of
criminal proceedings, the right of access to courts is linked to civil
remedies. 9 Although propelled from different origins, the right to
remain silent and the right of access to courts may collide when a
litigant asserts the right apainst self-incrimination in a civil case. Either
one can negate the other, or some boundary must be discerned within
the civil proceeding where the competing rights have sufficient space to
co-exist in a meaningful way. Where that line between the rights is
drawn may shape the course of the entire civil case, and indeed, as
discussed next, may determine whether the civil case should proceed at
all.
III. STAYING CASES OR SHUTTING COURTHOUSE DOORS

Often the first issue to present itself when civil and criminal
proceedings intersect is whether to stay the pending civil proceedings,
or, if a trial has been set, continue the trial in order to allow the criminal
proceedings to reach their conclusion. All things considered, someone
facing both criminal and civil liability for the same alleged acts will
usually focus attention and resources on the criminal proceedings.
Certainly the threat of imprisonment is far graver than the threat of
having to pay a money judgment.5 ' Even so, an adverse judgment in a
civil case carries considerable repercussions in its own right-financial,
46. DR Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A. of West Palm Beach, 819 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
47. Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992), recededfrom on other
grounds, 678 So. 2d 1239, 1253 (Fla. 1996).
48. Swain v. Curry, 595 So. 2d 168, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Holland v.
Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1944)).
49. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002) (right of access to courts "is
ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being
shut out of court"); Cunningham v. Dist. Atty's Office for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271
(11th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the vindication of
which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts."). See also Thomas R. Phillips, The
ConstitutionalRight to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1309 (2003).
50. See Heidt, supra note 7.
51. Cf Matter of Daniels, 570 A.2d 416, 424 (N.J. 1990) ("There is a difference between
money and freedom. No one can deny that the loss of liberty, next to the loss of life, is the
greatest deprivation that a free citizen can suffer.").
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social, and, for many, moral and ethical-consequences that force the
civil defendant who wishes to remain silent to elect from a choice of
evils. The defendant must either waive the Fifth Amendment right in
order to mount a defense in the civil litigation or else sit in silence while
the plaintiffs case receives a substantial advantage from the defendant's
exercise of the right (the extent of which, discussed later on, can be farreaching indeed). Rather than picking either of these unpleasant
alternatives, in many cases, the defendant will seek to halt the civil
proceedings altogether.
Does a civil defendant subject to potential criminal exposure have a
constitutional right to stay the civil proceedings because he or she
exercises the right to refuse to testify? As an absolute, the answer is
clearly no. The blanket assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege, in
itself, does not entitle a party to stay ongoing civil proceedings.5 2 On the
other hand, a civil trial court generally has broad discretion to stay or
refuse to stay a case pending before it.53 In certain instances, courts
have recognized that a limited stay might be the most practicable means
of securing a civil defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege without
sacrificing his defense in the civil case.54
In contrast to other jurisdictions, Florida case law does not currently
identify or prioritize any specific factors in deciding stay motions under
these circumstances. 55 Over time, though, what could be characterized
as three preconditions to stay a civil case because of a Fifth Amendment
objection have gradually coallesced. They include: (i) the propriety of
the assertion of the Fifth Amendment right (the "proper assertion"); (ii)
the likelihood that testimony or discovery sought in the civil case could
actually implicate the defendant criminally (the "proper link"); and (iii)
the length of time that the case would need to be stayed while the
defendant asserts the right (the "proper length"). 56 These three issues,
52. Urquiza v. Kendall Healthcare Grp., 994 So. 2d 476, 477-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008). See also Creative Consumer Concepts, Inc. v. Kreisler, 563 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir.
2009) ("The Constitution does not generally require a stay of civil proceedings pending the
outcome of criminal proceedings, absent substantial prejudice to a party's rights.") (citations
omitted).
53. Eicoff v. Denson, 896 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Regan, Inc. v. ValRo, Ltd., 396 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
54. See, e.g., In re J.E.B., 971 So. 2d 187, 188 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting a
continuance "might have been advisable" in juvenile dependency hearing where parent had
invoked Fifth Amendment right in response to questions regarding alleged child abuse); Kerben
v. Intercontinental Bank, 573 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (in cases where
defendants request a stay pending criminal investigation "courts will often find it appropriate to
stay the lawsuit so that the defendant's assertion of this constitutional right does not preclude
him from defending a civil suit.").
55. Other state courts have adopted enumerated lists of various factors that a trial court
should weigh when deciding a stay motion under these circumstances. See infra Part III.D.
56. See infra Part III.A, B, & C.
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either explicitly or implicitly, have emerged from the various reported
decisions of whether a pending civil case should or should not be stayed
due to parallel criminal proceedings. When viewed conjunctively, the
beginning of an analysis premised upon balancing the parties'
constitutional rights can be seen.
A. The ProperAssertion ("On Advice of Counsel, I Respectfully Invoke
My Right to Remain Silent and Decline to Answer Your Question.")
Before deciding whether to grant a stay, the first inquiry the civil
court must resolve is whether the defendant has actually invoked the
Fifth Amendment. A person might verbalize a refusal to testify in such a
way as to leave no room for doubt that he or she is exercising their Fifth
Amendment privilege, such as in the quotation above. 57 Sometimes,
though, the court is confronted with something not quite so obvious.58 A
party could state, "I'm not going to answer that question," without
indicating why. Or a witness might say nothing at all. There is no
special password needed to invoke the right to remain silent in a civil
proceeding, 59 but can one simply refuse to answer a question without
explanation and still remain under the protection of the Fifth
Amendment? 60
On this issue something of a bright line has emerged. A civil
defendant must actually declare that he or she is exercising the right to
57. The quotation is from Michaele and Tareq Salahi's repeated responses to questioning
from the House Homeland Security Committee regarding the Salahis' alleged "crashing" of a
November 2009 White House dinner party. See Janie Lorber, Uninvited White House Guests
Take the Fifth at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/21/us/politics/21crasher.html. Although there is no prescribed form, those words, or
some variant of them, seem to have become something of an accepted litany commonly used to
invoke the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify. See, e.g., United States v. King, 461 F.2d
53, 56 n.3 (8th Cir. 1972) (record of union member witness's responses in criminal prosecution
against fellow members accused of setting off a dynamite explosion during a labor strike); In re
Wincek, 202 B.R. 161, 164 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (individual bankruptcy debtor's written
invocation of the Fifth Amendment in his Statement of Income and Expenses in response to
request for information concerning his occupation and take home pay).
58. As happened in one of the infamous McCarthy hearings, a witness might invoke
multiple constitutional amendments, along with the Constitution in its entirety, provide his
personal commentary on the Constitution's sacred importance, and remark that he was not really
declining to answer a question, as part of a valid refusal to testify. See Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 180-83 (1955).
59. Id. at 162-63.
60. The sufficiency of a witness's Fifth Amendment assertion in the course of a criminal
interrogation raises very different issues, and hence, involves a different analysis than what is
being discussed here. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 1992)
(collecting cases, holding that interrogation must cease even if a suspect gives an ambiguous or
equivocal invocation, and that "[t]he suspect must only in some manner evidence a refusal to
talk further.") (citations and quotations omitted).
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refuse to testify in response to a question or a discovery request in order
to claim the constitutional protection. 6 1 An articulated and explicit
assertion of the right is necessary before a court can make a ruling
regarding its effect in the civil case. Rappaport v. Levy, a case from
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal, illustrates the importance of
this precondition. 62 In Rappaport, a civil dispute between veterinarians
over their practice turned into a criminal complaint of alleged theft and
improper use of the clinic's medicines. 63 The civil trial court initially
stayed the civil proceedings in their entirety to allow the parallel
criminal case to run its course.64 The trial court later relented somewhat,
lifting the stay on discovery, but ruling that the matter would not be set
for trial until the criminal suspect "was 'in a position where he can
testify at trial without compromising his Fifth Amendment Privilege,"'
even though he had not yet actually asserted a Fifth Amendment
privilege in response to any discovery request. 65 The appellate court
found the stay, premised as it was on the mere possibility that a party
would invoke his Fifth Amendment right, to be premature and granted
certiorari relief.66 What the Rappaportdecision did not explain was why
the possibility alone would not warrant staying the civil case, given
what was at stake for the criminal suspect.
A few years later, however, the same court had an opportunity to
expound on the justification for denying a stay in these circumstances.
In Eller Media Co. v. Serrano, the appellate court upheld the denial of a
request to stay a wrongful death case in which one of the defendants
claimed, through his counsel, that he would invoke his Fifth
61. Eller Media Co. v. Serrano, 761 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Rappaport v. Levy, 696 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("The cases which discuss
the effect of a party's claim of Fifth Amendment privilege uniformly involve situations in which
the claimant has already invoked the privilege, usually at deposition.") (collecting cases);
Fischer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 463 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (denying certiorari
regarding order compelling discovery and noting petitioner's failure to raise the objection or file
a written response with the objection in response to deposition questioning or request for
documents by stating that "[p]etitioner is required to make a specific objection to a particular
question and, at that time, assert his fifth amendment privilege."). The Fischercourt went so far
as to hold that the defendant's failure to articulate his Fifth Amendment objection to a request
for production of documents not only precluded appellate review, but required the defendant to
produce the documents requested. Fischer,463 So. 2d at 291. See also Global Aerospace, Inc. v.
Platinum Jet Mgmt., LLC, No. 09-60756-CIV, 2009 WL 2589116, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(collecting Eleventh Circuit authorities that "blanket assertion" of Fifth Amendment privilege
cannot justify stay in civil proceedings).
62. Rappaport,696 So. 2d at 526.
63. In fact, the defendant veterinarian in the civil case initiated the criminal complaint
against his former business partner. Id.
64. Id at 527.
65. Id
66. Id. at 527-28.
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Amendment privilege if called to testify because of related criminal
charges for manslaughter by culpable negligence.6 7 Among other issues,
the Eller Media court noted that no one had actually asserted a Fifth
Amendment privilege.6 8 The court was particularly troubled by what a
stay would mean to the civil plaintiffs' case:
Cabrera's parents will be prejudiced by a stay in this case
pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution. The statute of
limitations on a wrongful death case is two years and will run
before the criminal case is tried as scheduled in January 2001, or
in October 2002, when the criminal statute of limitations expires.
In their affirmative defenses, Eller Media and Garcia have
alleged that the negligence of third parties caused the incident in
question. However, Cabrera's parents will be precluded from
joining these additional parties if Eller Media and Garcia are not
compelled to disclose their identity until after the limitations
period expires.6 9
That the court considered and ultimately gave deference to the
prejudice a stay would impose on the civil plaintiffs is hardly
surprising, 70 but the scope of the interests the court describes-the
potential loss of claims, including those against future, unknown
parties-is worth noting. The prejudices catalogued in Eller Media that
precluded the defendant's requested stay were not contemporaneous in
the sense that the plaintiffs had demonstrated some increased cost or a
loss of available evidence that a stay would entail. They instead related
entirely to the potential detrimental impact a stay might have on the
plaintiffs' eventual recovery under their claims. In other words, to
borrow from pronouncements on the constitutional right of access, a
stay in the civil case could have left a wrong without a remedy. 7
B. The ProperLink
In order to obtain a stay over the civil proceedings based on a Fifth
Amendment privilege, the civil defendant must not only claim the right,
the defendant must also identify some link between potential criminality
and the issues, or questions, or discovery requests that cannot be
67. Eller Media Co. v. Serrano, 761 So. 2d 464,464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
68. Id. at 466.
69. Id.
70. Office Depot, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 937 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting trial courts' broad discretion to grant or deny stays in civil proceedings); see
also Eicoffv. Denson, 896 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
71. See Swain v. Curry, 595 So. 2d 168, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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responded to while exercising the right.72 In depositions and with
interrogatories, this is usually a fairly straight-forward, if not timeconsuming, problem: the responding party's claims of privilege are
analyzed question-by-question to determine whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege applies to each inquiry. Similarly, a Fifth
Amendment objection to a request for production of documents requires
analysis of the documents described in each request and whether
producing such documents could lead to self incrimination.74 The trial
court must make an objective determination regarding the
reasonableness of the Fifth Amendment claim in light of the topic of
inquiry and the issues in the case.7 5 The court must ask whether it is
reasonably possible that providing responsive testimony could, in some
way, incriminate the defendant in either a pending or a possible criminal
case. 76 If the defendant's response could potentially form "a link in the
chain of evidence which might lead to criminal prosecution," then the
Fifth Amendment may be invoked77 and it might be appropriate to stay
the civil case.
Sorting real from trivial threats of self-incrimination calls for judicial
discretion. 8 Notably, Florida appellate courts have articulated two
standards for trial courts to employ in discerning whether a sufficient
link to incrimination exists. One expression of the standard would seem
to favor a broader application of the Fifth Amendment right, not unlike
a presumption of validity, so that the objection will be sustained unless
72. Urquiza v. Kendall Healthcare Grp., 994 So. 2d 476, 477-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008); DeLeo v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 946 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
73. Belniak v. McWilliams, 44 So. 3d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (granting certiorari
of overbroad order compelling deponent to provide answers to six "lines" of questioning over
Fifth Amendment objection); Hitchcock v. Proudfoot Consulting Co., 19 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009) (trial court departed from essential requirements of law by failing to examine
Fifth Amendment objection on question-by-question basis); DeLeo, 946 So. 2d at 628 ("We
agree that the trial court was required to analyze each question to which DeLeo objected to
determine if the Fifth Amendment privilege applied."); Raass v. Borgia, 644 So. 2d 121, 121
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (granting in part and denying in part petition for certiorari based on
individual interrogatories subject to trial court's discovery order).
74. Boyle v. Buck, 858 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The Fifth Amendment
privilege applies somewhat less frequently to document requests because the act of producing
documents ordinarily carries less of a testimonial aspect to it. See infra Part IV.
75. DeLeo, 946 So. 2d at 629.
76. Eller Media Co. v. Serrano, 761 So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). See also
State v. Mitrani, 19 So. 3d 1065, 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("The threat of incrimination
must be 'substantial and real' and not 'merely trifling or imaginary."') (quoting United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1964); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980)).
77. Eller Media, 761 So. 2d at 466 (citing Delisi v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 934, 938 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)); Mitrani, 19 So. 3d at 1068.
78. DeLisi, 423 So. 2d at 938 (stating that measuring the propriety of a Fifth Amendment
objection in a civil case is "a matter which requires the exercise of the sound discretion of the
trial court under all the circumstances of the case.").
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it is "perfectly clear ... that the witness is mistaken and that the answer
cannot possibly have" an incriminating tendency. On the other hand,
there is case law that supports a more restrictive (or, at least, more
restrictively worded) standard, where it would be incumbent upon the
witness to show a "substantial and real threat of incrimination," as
opposed to one that is "merely trifling or imaginary," before availing
the right to remain silent in the civil case.8 0 In truth, both expressions of
the analysis revolve around the same determinative factor: objective
reasonableness; the trial court is charged with ascertaining whether the
individual's assertion of a Fifth Amendment objection is reasonable
under the circumstances. 8 '
Of course, whether a litigant's belief of potential criminality is
reasonable or not defies any fixed standard or definitive
pronouncement.82 Judicial decisions concerning reasonableness are
inherently exercises of discretion of weighing competing factors and
circumstances in a given context. 83 Although the concept of
reasonableness has been decried as a "notoriously general term" to rely
upon in constitutional analysis, 84 its generality imbues it with the
flexibility needed for this specific judicial task. Without a crystal ball, a
trial judge has little else to rely upon other than standards of
reasonableness to measure the true potential for incrimination within the
bounds of his or her sound discretion. Here as well, then, this
precondition of the civil stay analysis seems inexorably pointed toward
engaging in some manner of a balancing test between competing
79. See Raass v. Borgia, 644 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1980)).
80. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968); Belniak v. McWilliams, 44
So. 3d 1282, 1284-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reciting both standards); Mitrani, 19 So. 3d at
1068.
81. See McKay v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 876 So. 2d 666, 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(Fifth Amendment objection improper where state had given prosecutorial immunity to
defendant. "A litigant may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege when the litigant has
reasonablegrounds to believe that the response to a discovery request would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prove a crime against the litigant."); O'Neal v. Sun Bank, N.A.,
754 So. 2d 170, 171-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (civil litigant may use Fifth Amendment
privilege when there are reasonable grounds to believe that answering discovery could be used
in criminal proceedings against him or her); Rainerman v. Eagle Nat'l Bank of Miami, 541 So.
2d 740, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
82. On a more basic level, determining whether a potential sanction is truly "criminal" or
not, and therefore sufficiently linked to a witness's attempt to invoke the Fifth Amendment, is a
subject that has generated conflicting holdings from the Supreme Court. See Cheh, supra note 4,
at 1384-89.
83. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (in deciding Fourth Amendment
claim against school official's search of student's purse, "what is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place.").
84. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance
Searches, and FourthAmendment Reasonableness,66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1485, 1499 (2009).
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interests.
C. The ProperLength
Finally, Florida civil courts have paid close attention to the length of
time a requested stay would need to be in place to accommodate a Fifth
Amendment privilege claim. The venerable maxim, "justice delayed is
justice denied,"8 5 features prominently in this regard. Requests for
relatively short durations of time with a finite ending point have
generally received more favorable consideration, while protracted,
indefinite stays to accommodate ongoing investigations or lengthy
criminal proceedings are often rejected. In various reported decisions,
courts have refused what would necessarily amount to indeterminate or
prolonged stays in cases such as: a termination of parental rights
proceeding where the father also faced charges of murdering his child's
sibling that could have taken more than a year to try;86 post-judgment
collection proceedings where a key witness asserted her Fifth
Amendment right, but there was "nothing in the record to indicate the
duration of [the] abatement"; 8 7 and a breach of contract action against a
corporation and an individual guarantor (both of whom were under
investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice), where the trial court's
stay order had lasted nearly a year. As to this last example, while
noting the trial court's discretion to enter stays, Florida's Third District
Court of Appeal offered an important facet of the analysis: a stay might
be reasonable at first, but "there comes a time when a stay becomes
unreasonable under all circumstances." 8 9
On the other hand, courts in Florida have shown more indulgence
85. J. Sourine Painting, Inc. v. Johnson Paints, Inc., 809 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting adage and noting its application to both civil and criminal cases). This concept is
much more than a clich6 of aspiration as Judge Harris pointedly reminded the bench in his
concurring opinion in Ritter v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 700 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997):
[L]itigants' rights die because of judicial indecision-the property in litigation
loses value or is lost due to foreclosure of a prior mortgage, the inability to
pursue or collect a debt leads to bankruptcy, or the child involved in the
custody dispute is permitted to bond with the wrong parent. It should be the
highest aspiration of every judge to see the justice of the cause and, pursuant to
the law and the evidence, expeditiously achieve it. "Justice delayed is justice
denied" is not merely a slogan; it is a life truism.
86.
2000).
87.
88.
89.

C.J. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 756 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Kerben v. Intercontinental Bank, 573 So. 2d 976, 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Klein v. Royale Grp., Ltd., 524 So. 2d 1061, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 1062-63.
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when the requested stay of the civil proceedings would be for a more
measured or limited time. Examples of sanctioned durations include: a
civil litigant awaiting re-trial on a murder case, where "there is a
reasonably foreseeable end in sight for the criminal exposure"; 90 the
first nine months of a grand jury's investigation into a company's
financial dealings;91 a stay on mandated accounting during the
defendant's pending grand jury investigation for alleged securities
fraud;92 and, in a worker's compensation case, a limited stay regarding
the claimant's testimony and a final decision on the merits while
criminal charges of worker's compensation fraud were pending against
the claimant.
This final precondition for a stay, the proper length, much like the
second precondition, hinges on whether the length of time needed to
resolve the defendant's criminal proceedings would be "reasonable and
finite." 94 Such a standard purposely defies fixed declarations. Thus,
civil trial courts have broad discretion and relatively few constraints
regarding what the proper length of a stay should be beyond the charge
to mind, and then monitor, its duration. This calls for some measure of
prediction because neither the defendant nor the officials responsible for
investigating and prosecuting the defendant are likely to know the
precise length of time the investigation will require or how long the
criminal case will take to try.95 An equally important aspect of this
consideration is that it requires due regard for the rights and interests of
the plaintiff to proceed expeditiously with his or her civil case, interests
that must, the courts remind us, be given weight. 96 Finding where the
balance should fall between these interests requires both a global view
of what they are and a more honed understanding of their underlying
principles.
90. Brancaccio v. Mediplex Mgmt. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 711 So. 2d 1206, 1211-12 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
91. Klein, 524 So. 2d at 1061.
92. SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
93. Elliott-Gentry v. City of Altamonte Springs, OJCC Case No. 02-39275TGP, Order
Staying Proceedings, July 1, 2005 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, Office of the Judge of
Compensation Claims), available at http://www.jcc.state.fl.us/jccdocs20/ORL/Seminole/
2002/039275/2242311 .pdf.
94. Kerben v. Intercontinental Bank, 573 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
95. Even if investigating law enforcement officers have some idea of their investigation's
predicted length, they are generally under no mandate to inform the civil court of their opinions.
Cf FLA. STAT. § 119.071(2)(c)(1) (2010) (exempting criminal intelligence and investigative
information from public records disclosure requirements); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(g)(1) (2010)
(protecting prosecuting attorneys' work product from disclosure under criminal rules of
discovery); 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2010) (exempting under Federal Freedom of Information Act
requested records relate to criminal investigations).
96. Kerben, 573 So. 2d at 978 (citing Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 660 F. Supp. 1494
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
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D. Balancing the Stay Factors
The three preconditions outlined are by no means exclusive of other
potential concerns, nor are they necessarily the most pragmatic means
of categorization for adjudicating stay motions. In fashioning legal
standards for when a civil case should be stayed during parallel criminal
proceedings, appellate courts in other jurisdictions have identified a
variety of specific elements and factors-often as an enumerated listfor their trial courts to consider.9 7 A typical example is the catalogue of
factors the Alabama Supreme Court established, which calls upon trial
courts to weigh:
(1) The interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with
the civil litigation;
(2) The private interest of the defendant and the burden that the
civil proceedings may impose;
(3) The extent that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights are
implicated;
(4) The efficiency of managing judicial resources;
(5) The interests of non-parties to the civil litigation;
(6) The interest of the public in the pending criminal and civil
cases;
(7) The status of the criminal case; and
(8) The timing of the motion to stay. 9 8
Note that these factors could be grouped, delineated, or sub-divided
any number of ways.99 Regardless of how they are cast, two instructions
appear universally throughout all the cases implementing any list of
elements for trial courts to consider regarding these motions. First, the
trial courts are told to give due consideration to the civil plaintiffs'
interest in the expeditious resolution of their cases. 00 Second,
97. See, e.g., Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776, 789-90 (Ala. 2007) (eight factors can
potentially be weighed and balanced); State v. Deal, 740 N.W. 2d 755, 766 (Minn. 2007) (seven
factors to balance in deciding civil stay); State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 22 P.3d 124, 130
(Kan. 2001) (applying five factors, including plaintiffs interest in proceeding expeditiously
with case, to affirm denial of civil stay); Bell v. Todd, 206 S.W. 3d 86, 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)
(outlining five non-exclusive factors to consider for civil stay motions); Avant! Corp. v.
Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 4th 876, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (outlining five factors to
consider on request for civil stay due to parallel criminal proceedings); King v. Olympic
Pipeline Co., 16 P.3d 45, 52-53 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (reviewing federal law, identifying eight
factors, including the extent to which the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated).
98. Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 789-90.
99. Supra text accompanying note 97. See also State ex rel.Wright v. Stucky, 517 S.E.2d
36, 41 n.7 (W. Va. 1999) (noting "there are many permutations of this balancing act" of whether
to stay civil proceedings because of a Fifth Amendment claim).
100. Often that is the first factor listed. See Ebbers, 871 So. 2d at 789-90; Meneley, 22
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irrespective of how many factors a particular jurisdiction chooses to
apply, they must be "weighed" or "balanced" according to the facts of
the case.' ' In both regards, while Florida has not yet adopted an
express list of stay factors for these cases, its law aligns with the crux of
our sister states' jurisprudence. That is to say, the three strands I have
drawn from Florida case law are guideposts that lead ultimately to a
larger balancing inquiry, the same inquiry other courts make within the
frameworks of their own analyses, which, among other things, requires
consideration of the civil plaintiffs' interests.
What must be balanced? A senior district judge once deadpanned
that it is an exercise of balancing competing equities, and that it "can
get a little complicated." 10 2 Although the relative equities are certainly a
foremost concern whenever a stay is requested in a civil case (and there
are assuredly complexities involved), there is something more at work
here. When Florida courts look to the propriety of the Fifth
Amendment's claim, or the link between the claim and potential
criminality, or the length of the stay that is requested, the asserting
party's right to remain silent is, of course, the first point of reference.
However, there is also an element of the opposing party's constitutional
right of access to the civil court lurking close by. Reframing some of the
previous discussion even further into the view of that party, the
constitutional issues may be seen more clearly.
First, whether a proper claim has been made can be understood as a
preliminary gatekeeping inquiry by considering the underlying purpose
for this precondition. Why, one might ask, should it matter whether the
civil defendant has formally asserted a Fifth Amendment objection to a
pending question, so long as he or she makes clear that they will
ultimately refuse to testify in the case? Given the breadth of the Fifth
Amendment's historic protection and the potential evils it is supposed to
protect against, should not a defendant's representation alone suffice to
invoke the full extent of the right's protections?
The answer lies in what such an unfettered invocation could mean to
the civil plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts. Until the
Fifth Amendment right is actually claimed, its precise dimensions
within the case are, at best, conjecture,to3 and that is a poor basis for a
P.3d at 138; Avant!, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 887.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 97 & 99.
102. Milton Pollack, "Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings," Transferee Judges'
Conference, Oct. 17-19, 1989 (reported at 129 F.R.D. 201, 203).
103. For example, a blanket claim that a defendant will refuse to testify on Fifth
Amendment grounds, without more, leaves no room for the possibility that some specific
testimony or discovery requested of the defendant may have no real tendency to incriminate, or
that the defendant might choose to waive the right in certain lines of less self-incriminating
testimony in order to defend against the civil case.
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court to justify staying the plaintiffs right to have its case adjudicated.
If a civil defendant fails to make a valid and contemporaneous assertion
of his or her Fifth Amendment right in response to a specific inquiry,
then, in truth, there is nothing more to consider-that is, nothing to
balance-against the right of the civil plaintiff to maintain its cause of
action in court, which takes precedence over what is merely a potential,
inchoate, and unasserted privilege. That is precisely what occurred in
Eller Media, where the court, in essence, did nothing more than weigh
what was at stake for the civil defendant who had not actually claimed
his Fifth Amendment right against the civil plaintiffs' ability to
ultimately obtain redress for their injuries.' 04 The plaintiffs' interests
prevailed because there was nothing to counter their importance. The
outlines of the plaintiffs' constitutional interests may have only been
faintly sketched in the Eller Media opinion, but they are present
nonetheless, impressions, if you will, of what the constitutional right of
meaningful access to the judicial system would entail. 0 5 Only when one
party's constitutional right to remain silent has actually been claimed
can a true balancing against the opposing party's constitutional right of
access begin with consideration of the second precondition.
A court's determination of whether there exists a reasonable link
between the testimony sought and potential incrimination can likewise
be understood as part of a process of weighing the substantiality of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right against some countervailing
interest. The standards that have come down from the courts are phrased
as such. The threat of incrimination from testifying must be "substantial
and 'real,"' not "trifling" or "imaginary," for the defendant to avoid
obliging its adversary with responsive testimony.106 This is
quintessential balancing terminology, for its presence raises a question:
"trifling" as compared to what? Even the slightest possibility that one's
testimony might lead to criminal prosecution, however remote that
chance may be, would ordinarily be a matter of tremendous importance
to litigants who fear the prospect of imprisonment. In criminal cases,
this minimal restriction on the Fifth Amendment's exercise balances an
unwarranted refusal to testify against the practical necessity that the
state must be able to obtain evidence in order to prosecute criminal
activity. 0 7 Criminal courts will not countenance a "fanciful" Fifth
Amendment objection because, as the Supreme Court observed in
Brown v. Walker, "[e]very good citizen is bound to aid in the
104. Eller Media Co. v. Serrano, 761 So. 2d 464, 465-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
105. Cf Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-83 (11 th Cir. 2003), ("access to the courts
must be more than merely formal; it must also be adequate, effective, and meaningful.").
106. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968); Belniak, 44 So. 3d at 128485.
107. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 206 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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enforcement of the law."' 0 8
The societal interest in prosecuting alleged criminal activity is not
apparent in a civil case, and yet the same limitation has come to be
applied.109 Considering the gravity of a witness or litigant's right to be
free from self-incrimination in civil court, a forum devoted to civil
redress, any barrier to prevent the exercise of the Fifth Amendment's
protection (such as a trial court examining, question by question,
whether the threat of incrimination is minimal, or all but certain, or
something in between) must surely have an independent justification in
the proceedings. This justification is found in the apparent
counterweight of the civil plaintiffs constitutional right of access to
courts. A trivial chance of possibly infringing one person's
constitutional right will not justify the certain deprivation of another's.
A real threat of self-incrimination, on the other hand, may well warrant
some intrusion upon the civil plaintiffs constitutional right of access to
the courts, or, at least, support further consideration of other factors
implicated in the case, perhaps along the lines of those described in
other jurisdictions. Viewed in the guise of a balancing test, the
reasonable link precondition holds a readily defensible purpose. It is a
safeguard to ensure that civil defendants have something of substance to
place into their side of the scales against what already lies in the other.
Finally, the general injunction against limitless stays, as well as the
apparent indulgence of motions seeking stays for only a limited
duration, could not be anything other than a balancing of interests
between the parties. Excessive delay in a civil case must surely foil
someone's rights, or else the courts would simply stay every civil case
as a matter of course until the parallel criminal proceedings had reached
a definitive conclusion. Here again, the civil plaintiffs constitutional
right of access all but announces its presence as the justification for
each denial of a defendant's motion to stay a civil case; the right of
access necessarily encompasses some degree of promptness in the
adjudication of claims." 0 An interminable delay to accommodate a
Fifth Amendment objection vouchsafes the right to remain silent, true,
yet it also effectuates a denial of judicial access. The exercise of one
right becomes antithetical to the realization of the other, leaving to the
trial court the task of weighing their respective precedence.
When Florida courts decide whether or not to stay civil proceedings
to accommodate a Fifth Amendment objection, they are tacitly
108. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896).
109. Belniak v. McWilliams, 44 So. 3d 1282, 1284-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Eller
Media, 761 So. 2d at 466.
110. Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1282-83. See also Deboles v. State, 960 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (granting mandamus to require trial court to rule on motion that had been
pending for two years; "[W]e are concerned that the failure to rule on the motion filed by Mr.
Deboles so long ago might impair his right of access to the courts.").
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balancing two competing constitutional rights at three different points.
The defendant's constitutional right to remain silent-a right that a
defendant must actually assert in response to a real threat of
incrimination for a measurable duration-is weighed against the
plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts to timely
adjudicate its claims. This same constitutional struggle will appear
again and in even more pronounced ways should the civil case move
forward.

IV. ACCESS

OR SILENCE IN CIVIL DISCOVERY

Much of the civil litigation process revolves around discovery. In
Florida there is a liberal scope of what constitutes permissible discovery
in a civil case, the very nature of which necessitates a considerable
amount of mutual disclosure from civil litigants."' A broad discovery
process promotes a more fair and transparent trial, one that hopefully
will be free from "surprise, trickery, bluff and legal gymnastics."'
Mutual disclosure through discovery also furthers the possibility that
litigants, if given a free and open view of their opponent's case, might
be more inclined to settle their disputes another laudable goal Florida
When one side withholds
courts have repeatedly encouraged."
information that would otherwise be discoverable, the truth-finding
process contemplated by the rules of civil procedure is impeded, as is
the opposing party's ability to prepare its case.1 4 Thus, the potential
sanctions for failing to comply with a Florida court's discovery orders,
including striking a party's pleadings or entering an order of contempt,
are intentionally severe.
There is, however, another aspect of civil discovery that merits
consideration, which could arguably be its most important aspect for
purposes of the present discussion. Beyond facilitating access to
information, civil discovery fosters another kind of access as well. Most
plaintiffs bring their disputes into civil court to avail themselves of the

11. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boecher, 733 So. 2d 993, 995 (Fla. 1999); Grinnell Corp. v. Palms
2100 Ocean Blvd., Ltd., 924 So. 2d 887, 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See also Afro-Lecon,
Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting under federal rules of civil
procedure, "[t]he scope of civil discovery is broad and requires nearly total mutual disclosure of
each party's evidence prior to trial") (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
112. Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So. 2d 108, 111 (Fla. 1970).
113. Id. See also Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Cox, 974 So. 2d 462, 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
114. Heidt, supra note 7.
115. See FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b); Channel Components, Inc. v. Am. II Elecs., Inc., 915
So. 2d 1278, 1283-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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court's constituted power.11 6 Part of that power lies within the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide the means for taking
depositions, securing access to documents, inspecting land, and
propounding interrogatories and requests for admission.'" 7 These
discovery procedures, as part of the rules of civil procedure, seek "to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every [civil]
action." 118
One could then argue that a litigant not only has a right to present a
claim in court, but to use the court's truth-searching powers of
discovery to develop that claim. In that light, it would seem to follow
that the right to obtain discovery becomes a feature, albeit one of
debatable magnitude, of an individual's constitutional right of access to
the judicial system. The Supreme Court of Washington reached this
very conclusion in Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, a difficult case
that pitted a blood donor's right of privacy against an injured plaintiffs
right to discover how he was infected with contaminated blood.119
describing the parameters of the conflicting interests, the Puget Sound
court did not equivocate about what the plaintiffs interest in civil
discovery entailed:
Plaintiff has a right of access to the courts. In this civil case that
right of access includes the right of discovery authorized by the
civil rules subject to the limitations contained therein. [] The
court rules recognize and implement the right of access. The
discovery rules . . . grant a broad right of discovery which is

subject to the relatively narrow restrictions of CR 26(c). This
broad right of discovery is necessary to ensure access to the party
116. Florida law generally prohibits trial courts from issuing rulings that are merely
advisory, or which would have no practical force or effect. See Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein,
646 So. 2d 717, 720-21 (Fla. 1994) (authority to issue purely advisory opinions limited by
constitution); McMullen v. Bennis, 20 So. 3d 890, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (trial courts
are powerless to issue advisory rulings); Langdon v. State, 947 So. 2d 460, 463 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (courts should "avoid legal wheel spinning").
117. See generally FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3 10 and 1.320 (oral and written depositions), 1.340
(interrogatories), 1.350 (productions of documents and things and entry upon land for
inspection), 1.351 (subpoena for documents from non-parties), 1.370 (requests for admission).
118. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010. Florida's rules of civil procedure are offspring of the judiciary's
powers, adopted and implemented under the exclusive authority of the Florida Supreme Court
pursuant to the constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a); TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663
So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995).
119. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 372 (Wash. 1991) (en banc). It should
be noted that the right of access provision in the Washington Constitution is worded more
succinctly than the Florida constitution. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("Justice in all
cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay."), with FLA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, or delay.").
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seeking the discovery. It is common legal knowledge that
extensive discovery is necessary to effectively pursue either a
plaintiffs claim or a defendant's defense. Thus, the right of
access as previously discussed is a general principle, implicated
whenever a party seeks discovery. 120
No other court has gone quite so far as the Washington Supreme
Court in likening every discovery request to an exercise of a
constitutional right, ' but some have indicated at least a tacit level of
acceptance for the underlying assumption that the broader right of
discover is, in some way, a component of the constitutional right of
Indeed, in Florida law, the pure bill of discovery, an
access.
antiquated claim from equity jurisprudence, 123 maintains some limited
vitality, in part because its abrogation could impinge upon a claimant's
A connection exists,
constitutional right of access to the courts.'
however indefinable, between opening courts to resolve claims and
keeping them open to engage in discovery. Before exploring that issue
more thoroughly in Florida law, some further understanding of the kind
of evidence the Fifth Amendment may cover in civil discovery would
be beneficial.

120. Puget Sound, 819 P.2d at 374, 376.
121. More recently, the same court struck down a Washington statute that purported to
require medical malpractice plaintiffs to obtain a "certificate of merit" before engaging in civil
discovery as violating the right of access to courts. See Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr.,
P.S., 216 P.3d 374, 376 (Wash. 2009).
122. See, e.g., Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Hegwood, 569 So. 2d 1295, 1297
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (denial of plaintiff s pure bill of discovery regarding alleged medical
malpractice could foreclose her lawsuit, which would amount to "a denial of access to the courts
peculiar only to malpractice cases. That is fraught with constitutional problems.") (citing FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 21); Peter v. Progressive Corp., 986 P.2d 865, 872-73 (Alaska 1999) (noting that
appointment of discovery master to oversee civil discovery disputes could be so costly as to
infringe upon litigants' state constitutional right of access to courts); Stokes v. 835 N.
Washington St., LLC, 784 A.2d 1142, 1149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) ("Indeed, a rule denying
a party's right to seek an equitable bill of discovery may well violate the party's constitutional
right of access to the courts."); Long v. Am. Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 660 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
"On a general level, the interest of an injured plaintiff in discovering information which is
relevant .. . is an interest which has long been recognized by the judicial system and which may
well be implicit in the Constitution." Id. (citing Puget Sound, 819 P.2d at 360).
123. When properly pled, a plaintiff who is a putative party in a potential legal action may
obtain listed discovery items from defendants named in the bill prior to filing an actual lawsuit
for damages. Following the merger of Florida equity and law courts and the adoption of the
rules of civil procedure for all civil actions, the bill "has limited use in today's legal
environment." See Daniel Morman, The Complaint for a Pure Bill of Discovery a Living,
BreathingModern Day Dinosaur?, 78 FLA. B. J. 50, 54 (Mar. 2004).
124. Hegwood, 569 So. 2d at 1295, 1297.
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A. The Contours of Testimonial Evidence
In a typical pre-trial discovery dispute, one party has propounded a
request for some form of information-documents, answers to
questions, responses to requests for admissionl 25 -and the party
receiving the request, for some reason or another, refuses to furnish the
information by making an objection.126 The court holds a hearing on the
issue, usually prompted by either a motion to compel from the
propounding party or a motion for protective order from the objecting
party, and then issues a ruling.127 Under the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court has a variety of means to fashion an
appropriate remedy and to facilitate relevant, proper discovery.128
Unlike the more common discovery objections, however, the discretion
and the sanctioning powers of a civil court to resolve discovery disputes
is markedl restrained when confronted with a proper Fifth Amendment
objection.'
The case law that has evolved in this area bears some
resemblance to the case law regarding stays.
First, the issue of whether responses to discovery may be compelled
through the threat of sanctions in a civil case is preliminarily examined
by comparing the questions or requests themselves with the plausible
threat that answering them could expose the individual to criminal
sanctions. 3 0 Again, this requires question-by-question consideration of
the propounded discovery.'31 In the context of answering
interrogatories, the rule has been described that "a court may compel a
125. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(a) (describing discovery methods).
126. E.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a) (describing requirements for objections to
interrogatories); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.350(b) (objections to production requests); FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.370(a) (objections to requests for admission); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(d)(1)-(3) (objections
during depositions).
127. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c) (protective orders); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(a) (motions to
compel).
128. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b) (listing various sanctions for failure to comply with order
permitting discovery); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(d) (incorporating sanctions for failure to appear for
deposition, respond to interrogatories, or permit inspection).
129. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) ("[T]he power to compel
testimony is not absolute . . . . It [the Fifth Amendment privilege] can be asserted in any

proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . .");
Burnette v. Stanton, 751 So. 2d 728, 728-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (quashing discovery
order that would have compelled civil defendant to answer interrogatories concerning car
accident while DUI manslaughter charges were pending). See also Sandra Guerra, Between a
Rock and a Hard Place: Accommodating the Ffth Amendment Privilege in Civil Forfeiture
Cases, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 555, 561-65 (1999).
130. DeLeo v. Wachovia Bank. N.A., 946 So. 2d 626, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
Eisenstein v. Citizens & S. Nat'1 Bank of Fla., 561 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
131. Belniak v. McWilliams, 44 So. 3d 1282, 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Hitchcock
v. Proudfoot Consulting Co., 19 So. 3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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litigant to answer questions only if it is perfectly clear that the litigant is
mistaken in his apprehension and that the answers to the interrogatories
cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate."' 32 The same rule
applies to oral questioning as well; aside from the imposition of an
adverse inference, a civil court is powerless to coerce a party to answer
a question over a Fifth Amendment objection if a response could
possibly provide an evidentiary link in a potential criminal
investigation.1 33 The prohibition is absolute, and its violation in civil
proceedings could result not only in reversal on appeal, but suppression
of the unlawfully coerced testimony, as well as the "fruits" of that
testimony, in any subsequent criminal proceedings. 3 4
With discovery, however, there arises a critical Fifth Amendment
distinction depending on the character of the evidence sought. The
Amendment's text, and hence its protection, is anchored to testimony.135
The act of testifying, whether orally or in writing, receives the greatest
level of protection under the Fifth Amendment because the
amendment's principal aim has always been to prevent inquisitorial
coercion of involuntary testimony, a prospect courts liken to the
infamous Star Chamber hearings. 3 6 There is, thus, a demarcation
between testimonial answers and non-testimonial, physical evidence
requested in civil discovery, the latter remaining generally available to
the litigant developing his or her case.' 3 7
The boundary between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence that
has evolved from the Supreme Court over time was summarized in Doe
v. United States.: "in order to be testimonial, an accused's
communication, explicitly or implicitly, relate to a factual assertion or
disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a 'witness'
against himself." 38 Florida's case law holds similarly, "The Fifth
Amendment privilege does not shield every kind of incriminating
evidence. Rather, it protects only testimonial or communicative
evidence, not real or physical evidence which is not testimonial or
communicative in nature."1 39 Documents, such as those held by a
132. O'Neal v. Sun Bank, N.A., 754 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Burnette
v. Stanton, 751 So. 2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
133. Magid v. Winter, 654 So. 2d 1037, 1038-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
134. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 281 n.7 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 473-74 (1975) (White, J., concurring).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 762-64 (1966).
137. Boyle v. Buck, 858 So. 2d 391, 392-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
138. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) (upholding contempt finding against
defendant who refused, on Fifth Amendment ground, to execute written directive authorizing
foreign banks to release information requested in grand jury investigation).
139. Boyle, 858 So. 2d at 393.
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witness or a party in the course of their business or in a fiduciary
capacity, do not normally constitute protected communicative testimony
within the Fifth Amendment's ambit.140 For example, corporate agents
refusing to testify in their own individual right could not refuse to
comply with a subpoena for corporate records that they would otherwise
have a fiduciary responsibility to produce. 14 1 Likewise, an attorney
representing a client in a tax dispute with the IRS could not rely upon
his client's Fifth Amendment right and refuse to produce his client's

accounting records.142
This boundary, though easily stated, is not always easy to find.
Pisciotti v. Stephensl43 provides a good example of when the line
between protected testimony and non-testimonial records might become
blurred. In Pisciotti, a woman served as the personal representative for
her deceased parents' estates.144 When the personal representative's
brother discovered some suspicious checks being disbursed, he
instituted an adversary proceeding against her in probate court, removed
her as the personal representative, and sought to compel her deposition
testimony and an accounting of the estates' assets. 14 5 He also threatened
to file a criminal complaint against her, which prompted her to assert
her Fifth Amendment right and refuse to either testify at her deposition
or provide the accounting in the adversary proceeding. 146 In reversing
the trial court's order compelling her responses to the deposition
questions, the appellate court reiterated the distinction that the Fifth
Amendment protects only testimonial or communicative evidence, not
real or physical evidence.1 47 The accounting, however, posed a close
140. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110, 113-14 (1988).
141. Id.; Federated Inst. for Patents & Trademark Registry v. Office of the Att'y Gen., 979
So. 2d 1162, 1165-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). However, the corporate agent cannot be
compelled, over a Fifth Amendment objection, to testify where the corporate documents are
located if they are not already in his or her possession. See Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Apr. 9,
1996 v. Smith, 87 F.3d 1198, 1200 (1lth Cir. 1996).
142. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976).
143. Pisciotti v. Stephens, 940 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
144. Id. at 1219.
145. Under the Florida Probate Rules, a court may require a removed personal
representative to complete a financial accounting form listing the estate's assets, liabilities, and
distributions, which the representative must verify under penalty of perjury. See FLA. PRoB. R.
5.345 & 5.346.
146. Pisciotti,940 So. 2d at 1219.
147. Id. at 1221. The Fifth Amendment may also be invoked in response to a document
request when the very act of producing the documents takes on some incriminating testimonial
significance in its own right, apart from any potentially incriminating evidence that may be
contained in the documents themselves. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36-37 (2000).
These situations have been characterized as a "narrow slot" of cases where the government
subpoenas a potential criminal defendant for documents that the government cannot identify
with any particularity. Federated Inst. for Patents & Trademark Registry v. Office of the Att'y
Gen., 979 So. 2d 1162, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to John Doe,
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question about that distinction, which split the Pisciotti panel.14 8
Recalling precedent from the Florida First District Court of Appeal, the
Pisciotti majority noted that, as to documents, the Fifth Amendment
generally extended only to personal papers or those that were held for a
purely personal purpose, and did not protect documents held as a
fiduciary or as a corporate agent. 149 Notwithstanding the fiduciary
nature of a personal representative's financial accounting report, the
majority found that such a paper falls more in line with communicative
testimony that is shielded by the Fifth Amendment, because to hold
otherwise would have had the "perverse effect" of compelling the
personal representative to disclose the same incriminating evidence that
would have been protected in her deposition.1 50
For the dissenting judge in Pisciotti,though, the distinction between
compelled deposition testimony and legally mandated bookkeeping
warrants different treatment under the Fifth Amendment. s5 According
to the dissent, the accounting should have been compelled under the
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal's precedent of Wright v.
Department of Health & RehabilitationServices.152 The Wright case is
worth examining because it describes an interesting ripple of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against production of documents that have an
arguably testimonial character to them. In that case, a professional
guardian, who had been removed for exploiting her wards' funds, was
jailed for contempt when she refused to prepare a statutorily required
accounting, similar to what an estate's personal representative's
accounting would include.' 53 Like the representative in Pisciotti, the
former guardian asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.1 54 The Wright court, however, upheld the trial court's
contempt order, effectively leaving the civil defendant in jail for trying
to exercise her right to remain silent. 5 5 The court presumably
recognized that the accounting had a testimonial aspect to it, but
nevertheless upheld the compulsion of the accounting under the
Supreme Court's "required records" exception to the Fifth
Amendment.156 One who voluntarily assumes a legal duty to prepare an
accounting record essentially waives the right to later assert that
475 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1188 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
148. Pisciotti,940 So. 2d at 1221.
149. Id. at 1220-21.
150. Id. at 1221.
151. Id.
152. Wright v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 668 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
153. Id. at 662. Florida Statute section 744.511 requires a removed guardian to provide a
final report within twenty days of removal.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 663 (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)).
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discharging the duty could lead to self-incrimination.' 5 7 Like other
features of the Fifth Amendment in civil litigation, the communicative
aspect of writing and preparing a document is not protected as a matter
of course; in some circumstances, the right could be trumped by other
interests.
B. The Sword and Shield of the Fifth Amendment
Just as the type of discovery sought may affect the application of the
Fifth Amendment in civil proceedings, who a discovery request is
directed to plays an important factor, as well. Although it is usually the
case that a defendant or a non-party witness is compelled to assert their
Fifth Amendment right in a civil case, the privilege is by no means
limited in civil cases to civil defendants or third party witnesses. In a
few reported cases, plaintiffs have been allowed to invoke the
constitutional right to refuse to testify in their own lawsuits free from
adverse discovery sanctions.
Historically this was not the case. Under the so-called "sword and
shield" doctrine, a plaintiff could not wage a civil lawsuit while refusing
to respond to the defendant's discovery requests by using the "shield" of
the Fifth Amendment as if it were a "sword." 5 8 The result of a plaintiff
exercising his or her right to remain silent was invariably to have his or
her pleadings stricken or the case dismissed for refusing to comply with
the trial court's discovery orders. The distinction between plaintiffs and
defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment right was justified on two
grounds: first, the inherent unfairness in allowing the plaintiff to obtain
discovery while not providing any to the defendant, whose presence in
court, unlike the plaintiffs, was presumably involuntary; and second,
that the filing of a civil lawsuit governed by the rules of discovery
effectively waived the Fifth Amendment right to refuse to respond to
discovery requests. 159 Quoting a New York federal district court, the
Florida Supreme Court stated:

157. Under the exception these documents, by virtue of their regulatory and mandatory
nature, are not truly testimonial because they are created for the benefit of the public, which
precludes the assertion of a private privilege by one who is lawfully obligated to create them.
See Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 17-18; Goethel v. Lawrence, 599 So. 2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
158. See Fassi v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 700 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Kerben v. Intercontinental Bank, 573 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (collecting
Florida cases); Rollins Burdick Hunter of N.Y., Inc. v. Euroclassics Ltd., Inc., 502 So. 2d 959,
962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. 1964); Kerben, 573 So. 2d at 978
(citing Fischer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 463 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); City of St.
Petersburg v. Houghton, 362 So. 2d 681, 683-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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It would be uneven justice to permit plaintiffs to invoke the
powers of this court for the purpose of seeking redress and, at the
same time, to permit plaintiffs to fend off questions, the answers
to which may constitute a valid defense or materially aid the

defense.160
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting
System161 marked something of a turning point for the doctrine in
Florida. In Wehling, the owners of Texas trade schools had sued CBS in
libel for airing a less-than-flattering documentary that charged the
owners with using student loan and grant programs to defraud the
federal government.' 62 When the school owners, who were also under
investigation by a federal grand jury, asserted the Fifth Amendment and
refused to answer CBS's deposition questions, the district court
dismissed their complaint with prejudice as a sanction.163 The Fifth
Circuit reversed and offered this reasoning:
We believe that dismissing a plaintiffs action with prejudice
solely because he exercises his privilege against selfincrimination is constitutionally impermissible. Wehling had, in
addition to his Fifth Amendment right to silence, a due process
right to a judicial determination of his civil action. When the
district court ordered Wehling to answer CBS' questions or suffer
dismissal it forced plaintiff to choose between his silence and his
lawsuit. W4
The court then reframed the discovery sanctions issue as one of
minimizing the amount of potential harm between the plaintiff and
defendant's respective interests: "When plaintiffs silence is
constitutionally guaranteed, dismissal is appropriate only where other,
less burdensome, remedies would be an ineffective means of preventing
unfairness to defendant."' 6 5
Two reported Florida appellate decisions have expressed a level of
acceptance of the ruling in Wehling. First, in Village Inn Restaurant v.
Aridi, where a worker's compensation claimant refused to respond to
his employer's deposition questions, the First District Court of Appeal
held that some form of sanction would be appropriate, but, in light of
160. Stockham, 168 So. 2d at 322 (quoting Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D.
266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)).
161. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1979).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1087-88.
165. Id. at 1088.
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Wehling it need not automatically be the dismissal of the employee's
claim. ' Nine years later, in Brancaccio v. Mediplex Management of
Port St. Lucie, Inc., a professional negligence case in which the
plaintiffs complaint had been dismissed because of his refusal to
provide a presuit statement and deposition, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal applied Wehling more forcefully and directed the trial court to
stay the civil action until the plaintiffs retrial for murder was
concluded, ruling that the sword and shield doctrine "does not
inexorably require a dismissal."l 6 7 These two opinions appear to stand
alone in Florida's jurisprudence on this issue, and neither court
purported to dispense with the sword and shield doctrine in its entirety.
Thus, it is unclear whether Wehling supplanted the sword and shield
doctrine in Florida or merely marked a temporary relaxation in its
application.' 6 8
Regardless, both views of this doctrine serve to illustrate how the
constitutional right of access can be implicated when a Fifth
Amendment objection is made to a civil discovery request. For the
courts applying the sword and shield doctrine, the reasons they espouse
appear to revolve, in some degree, around the larger right of
constitutional access as much as anything else. Seeing this simply
requires a shift in focus. The principal actor holding the right becomes
the civil defendant, who has a constitutional right of due process
throughout the proceedings, and, arguably, a separate constitutional
right to have the justice of his opponent's claim administered without
denial or delay.1 69 No less than plaintiffs, defendants who are called into
civil court are entitled to avail themselves of the procedural rules of
discovery. And not infrequently it is the civil defendant clamoring for
the earliest trial or a final hearing to dispense with what may be
perceived as a frivolous lawsuit. Hindering that party's ability to
166. Vill. Inn Rest. v. Aridi, 543 So. 2d 778, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
167. Brancaccio v. Mediplex Mgmt. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 711 So. 2d 1206, 1211 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
168. More than likely the latter, judging from the number of case opinions released since
Wehling that continue to apply the doctrine. See, e.g., Fassi, 700 So. 2d at 52; Kerben v.
Intercontinental Bank, 573 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Rollins Burdick Hunter
of N.Y., Inc. v. Euroclassics Ltd., 502 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). See also Boys
& Girls Club of Marion County, Inc. v. J.A., 22 So. 3d 855, 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(Griffin, J., concurring) (in certiorari proceeding of discovery order, commenting that the law is
"well settled" that a civil plaintiff "is not entitled to both his silence and his lawsuit").
169. Cf Andrews, supra note 39, at 593-94 (noting disagreement among courts as to
whether the right of access ends upon the filing of a complaint or extends throughout the course
of civil litigation). Andrews argues for the more narrow view, albeit without this specific issue
in mind, but notes the attendant requirement of affording constitutional due process throughout
court proceedings once initial access has been granted. Id. at 645-47. There is, to use her words,
"a good fit" between the right of access and the right of due process the courts must afford in
judicial proceedings. Id. at 647.
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develop and prove its defense or delaying an ultimate resolution of the
case may indeed be "'uneven justice"' that warrants some leveling of
the constitutional ground between the parties. 170
Yet, it is within the admittedly unique holdings of Wehling, Aridi,
and Brancaccio that we clearly see the right of access emerging as an
issue within this niche of civil discovery law. The analysis in Wehling
illustrates its prominence almost to the point of being blunt. The trial
court's dismissal of Wehling's lawsuit was not improper because of a
misapplied legal standard or an incorrect conclusion drawn from the
plaintiffs alleged facts; rather it was "constitutionally impermissible"
because it violated the plaintiffs rights of due process to have a
"judicial determination of his civil action." 7 ' According to the Wehling
court, the plaintiff should never have been forced "to choose between
his silence and his lawsuit" as a matter of constitutional imperative.172
The trial court's powers to sanction discovery violations were bounded
not only by the Fifth Amendment, but by the additional constitutional
directive to provide meaningful access to the courts.

V.

THE EFFECTS OF ASSERTING THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT IN A
CIVIL TRIAL

We turn now to the effect of the Fifth Amendment in civil law where
the right of access may well loom the largest: how the right to remain
silent affects the merits of a civil case. Assuming a civil action proceeds
and the defendant's refusal to testify under the Fifth Amendment does
not yield significant discovery sanctions, the landscape of the case
becomes remarkably altered. One could conceive of any number of
repercussions a defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent
might have on the merits of the plaintiff s claims.' Two principal ones
are discussed here.
A. PragmaticEffects
First and perhaps most obviously, a defendant who exercises the
right to remain silent is placed at a significant strategic disadvantage
before the finder of fact in the civil case. In order to avail himself or
herself of the constitutional right, the defendant, confronted by his or
her adversary, must remain silent; however the plaintiff, unconstrained
by the prohibitions present in criminal proceedings, is afforded the
170.
171.
172.
173.

Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So. 2d 320, 322 (Fla. 1964).
Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1087-88 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1088.
Heidt, supra note 7; infra text accompanying note 175.
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opportunity to paint the defendant's actions in the worst possible light.
The defendant will be unable to say anything to counter, or disprove, or
mitigate the plaintiffs charges. Such a muted response may lend
credence to the opposing party's claims, for, as Justice Brandeis once
remarked, "[s]ilence is often evidence of the most persuasive
character."1 74 Yet the defendant's quandary is not just the necessity to
remain silent, which could be damaging enough in its own right. A civil
jury will usually be allowed to hear the defendant's spoken assertion of
the constitutional right to remain silent,1 75 a prompt that could tacitly
link the prospect of potential criminality to the defendant's actions. And
again, unlike criminal proceedings, there is no outright prohibition
against openly commenting on a civil litigant's assertion of the right to
refuse to testify, leaving advocates and parties more or less free to
expound on the fact that their opponent is claiming a right against selfincrimination, and all that implies.
As damaging as such pragmatic considerations could be to the
tactical presentation of a civil defense, there is also a substantive legal
consequence that the Fifth Amendment's invocation carries with respect
to the merits of a plaintiffs claims. This second effect, and the
constitutional access issues it implicates, is examined next.
B. The Adverse Inference
A defendant's assertion of the Fifth Amendment in a civil case
carries one vital legal ramification that may drive the ultimate
adjudication of the case's merits. In Florida, as in many jurisdictions,
the finder of fact in a civil case may draw an adverse inference from the
defendant's silence and permissibly assume that the defendant's
response, had he or she answered a question or provided requested
discovery, would have indeed contained unfavorable, damaging, or
incriminating evidence.' 76 Courts and commentators have advanced a
174. United States, ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923).
175. Fraser v. Sec. & Inv. Corp., 615 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Cerro Gordo
Charity v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 1471, 1480-81 (8th Cir. 1987); Cf
Wilson v. Misko, 508 N.W. 2d 238, 253 (Neb. 1993); Kramer v. Levitt, 558 A.2d 760, 763, 76667 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (both cases holding that requests for admissions and the
defendant's Fifth Amendment responses could be read to the jury). Note, however, in a
somewhat unique bailment case, the Fourth District held that a plaintiff could not call a nonparty witness for the sole purpose of having him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege aloud
before the jury. Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Estate of Guzman, 421 So. 2d 597, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982). The Guzman court's reversal seemed to turn on the fact that the witness was not a party
to the civil case. Id. at 603-04.
176. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1976); Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC
v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. White,
589 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1979)); Arango v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 115 F.3d 922, 926 n.10
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variety of justifications for the inference: it derives from "'common
sense"' that people will speak in their own defense when faced with a
false accusation; it discourages frivolous invocations of the privilege; it
fosters the ultimate search for truth.'" Employing a familiar metaphor
in its review of a contempt order arising out of an IRS proceeding, the
Supreme Court observed that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a shield,
not a sword "whereby a claimant asserting the privilege would be freed
from adducing proof in support of a burden which would otherwise
In Florida law, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
have been his."
offered a fairly succinct justification for the inference in Fraser v.
Security & Investment Corp.: "Such a rule is both logical and utilitarian.
A party may not trample upon the rights of others and then escape the
consequences by invoking a constitutional privilege-at least not in a
civil setting." 79
The effect of the adverse inference is not without limits. For
example, under federal law, a court may not enter summary judgment or
dismiss a complaint based solely on a party's assertion of the Fifth
Amendment and the adverse inference against the litigant's silence. 8
This follows from the basic proposition that whatever inference or
persuasiveness it may give rise to, silence, by itself, is not a substitute
for evidence.18 ' Nor has any reported Florida decision upheld
adjudication in favor of a plaintiffs claim absent some evidence in
addition to the defendant's Fifth Amendment objection.' 82
(11th Cir. 1997); Atlas v. Atlas, 708 So. 2d 296, 297 n.1, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Fraser,
615 So. 2d at 842.
177. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319 ("[The Fifth Amendment] has little to do with a fair trial
and derogates rather than improves the chances for accurate decisions."); Charles H. Rabon, Jr.,
Evening the Odds in Civil Litigation: A Proposed Methodology for Using Adverse Inferences
when Nonparty Witnesses Invoke the Ffth Amendment, 42 VAND. L. REv. 507, 536-48 (1989)
(collecting authorities); Katharine M. Traylor, Constitutional Law-A Reexamination of the
Evidentiary Weight of Adverse Inferences Drawn from an Employee's Invocation of His Fifth
Amendment Silence-Harmon v. Mifflin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 713 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1998), 73 TEMP. L.
REv. 379, 385-92 (2000) (reciting Pennsylvania authorities).
178. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757-58 (1983).
179. Fraser,615 So. 2d at 842.
180. Eagle Hosp., 561 F.3d at 1304; United States v. Premises Located at Route 13, 946
F.2d 749, 756 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Transnet Wireless Corp., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1252
n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
181. Rylander, 460 U.S. at 758 (The Fifth Amendment "has never been thought to be in
itself a substitute for evidence that would assist in meeting a burden of production."). See also 8
JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2272, at 429 n.14 (McNaughton ed. 1961)
(collecting cases).
182. Cf Atlas v. Atlas, 708 So. 2d 296, 297 n.1, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming
alimony modification and contempt order against former husband where, in addition to asserting
his Fifth Amendment privilege regarding his financial status, he had exhibited a pattern of
failing to pay support obligations and then satisfying purge provisions of prior contempt orders
at the "last minute" before incarceration).
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Still, nowhere else in this area of the law is the contrast between civil
and criminal proceedings more stark. Drawing an inference against a
defendant who asserts the right to remain silent would be the complete
antithesis of the law in criminal proceedings.' 83 Take the same
defendant who raises a Fifth Amendment objection to the same
questions under the same set of facts; a substantial evidentiary inference
in the plaintiffs favor arises in the civil case, while the jury in the
criminal trial would be admonished not to consider the objection at all.
Given the tactical advantages of what a defendant's assertion of the
Fifth Amendment objection could mean for a civil plaintiffs case, why
is an adverse inference even needed? What further ends does it serve?
Indeed, why not let the civil fact-finder draw its conclusions from a
point of neutrality and balanced consideration, weighing the defendant's
refusal to testify in whatever manner deemed appropriate in the light of
all the other evidence?l 84
The short answer, according to some courts, is that there is simply
more at stake in the criminal proceedings.' 8 5 The Fifth Amendment
safeguards the right to be free from the threat of state-coerced
incrimination. 186 That protection necessarily precludes any adverse
criminal penalties from the exercise of the right. In a civil case, on the
other hand, applying an adverse legal assumption is permissible,
perhaps even necessary, because the Fifth Amendment's principal aim
is "to protect individuals from criminal, not civil liability."' 8 7 As the
Eleventh Circuit remarked in affirming a default judgment sanction, in a
civil case, unlike a criminal case, "the decision to invoke the Fifth
Amendment does not have to be consequence-free."' 8 8
This may strike one as somewhat tautological, though; in essence,
the inference is countenanced in civil proceedings because the
proceedings are not criminal. Not only is this unsatisfying logically,
such a justification fails to account for the relatively wide scope of noncriminal legal repercussions the courts have prohibited in various Fifth

183.

See FLA. CRIM. JURY INST. 2.1 (the instruction is given at the defendant's request. "In

every criminal proceeding a defendant has the absolute right to remain silent. At no time is it the
duty of a defendant to prove [his or her] innocence. From the exercise of a defendant's right to
remain silent, a jury is not permitted to draw any inference of guilt, and the fact that a defendant
did not take the witness stand must not influence your verdict in any manner whatsoever.");
Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002).
184. This question assumes particular significance when instructing a civil jury about the
inference they may (or may not) make. See infra Part V.C.
185. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1976).
186. See supra Part II.A.
187. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 566 (5th Cir. 1987).
188. Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2009).
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Amendment cases.1 89 A more thoughtful answer to the question of why
adverse legal inferences arise in civil cases may be found by focusing
on the rights and interests of the other party affected by the Fifth
Amendment objection in a civil case. For the same reason that the civil
case would not be automatically stayed because of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege, the justification for the inference may also rest
on the uneven status of the civil plaintiff in contrast to the government
in a criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court in Mitchell v. United
States pointed out the importance of this difference in upholding the use
of adverse inferences in civil proceedings:
In ordinary civil cases, the party confronted with the invocation
of the privilege by the opposing side has no capacity to avoid it,
say, by offering immunity from prosecution. The rule allowing
invocation of the privilege, though at the risk of suffering an
adverse inference or even a default, accommodates the right not
to be a witness against oneself while still permitting civil
litigation to proceed.
The final phrase of this part of the opinion is especially noteworthy.
The adverse inference comports with an "accommodation" of the right
to remain silent that allows the civil litigation to proceed. The extent of
the inference is prophylactic; or, as one district court characterized it, it
is "necessarily fluid in light of the other evidence presented and may in
reality prove quite limited" to the case.191 But whatever its extent, the
inference is an aid to help define and draw a line around competing
interests: the right to remain silent, on the one hand, and having the civil
litigation proceed, on the other. Accommodation takes on a larger
meaning here with the inference minimizing the detriment that the
defendant's refusal to testify inflicts upon the civil plaintiff. That
detriment is unique to civil proceedings because the civil plaintiff had a
constitutionally protected interest to have its case heard, which the
defendant's refusal to testify undermines. Accommodation, in short,
becomes the means of balancing the right of access to the court.
A case from the Fifth Circuit further illustrates this point. In Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Dixon, the receiver of a failed
savings and loan association sued several of the association's former
officers for alleged fraud and misappropriation of the association's

189. See supratext accompanying notes 27-31.
190. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999).
191. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Monterosso, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
See also LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing applicability
and weight of adverse inference in civil case).
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funds.192 The receiver sought and eventually obtained a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendants that
froze their personal assets.193 On appeal, the officers, who were also
subjects of a pending criminal prosecution, argued that the trial court
had improperly used their refusal to testify against them in entering its
injunction orders.194 While recognizing the somewhat extraordinary
extent of the trial court's injunction-a freeze order, which one
defendant complained would result in the loss of his house-the Fifth
Circuit nevertheless affirmed.
The defendants allege that they have failed to cooperate because
they must invoke their fifth amendment right not to incriminate
themselves. This fifth amendment right serves to protect
individuals from criminal, not civil, liability. The district court in
a civil case so crippled by the fifth amendment as this one, must
balance the defendant's rights not to incriminate themselves
against the plaintiffs right to a meaningful remedy. Precedent
supports the trial court's inference that the defendant's testimony,
if provided, would have been adverse to each of them.19 5
Dixon's instruction to balance the right to remain silent against the
plaintiffs right to "a meaningful remedy" (a term courts frequently use
to describe the constitutional right of access to courts),196 is followed in
the very next sentence by an affirmation of the use of adverse inferences
against a defendant. The inference here becomes a tool in the task of
balancing these competing constitutional rights.
Linking the adverse inference to the constitutional right of access
also explains the inference's presence in Florida law as well. While the
appellate court in Fraser never expounded on precisely which rights
were being "trampled" when the defendant asserted his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, such strident language resonates
from the same nerve that was touched in Mitchell and Dixon. A
defendant's refusal to testify when called upon in civil court, in and of
itself, deprives the plaintiff not only of the testimony he or she would
have been entitled to, but, more fundamentally, of a full hearing and a
192. Dixon, 835 F.2d at 556.
193. Id. at 556-57. The circuit court conceded that this was an unusual remedy to fashion
within a preliminary injunction, it really being more in the nature of a prejudgment attachment.
Id. at 559-60.
194. Id. at 559.
195. Id. at 565 n.2, 566 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
196. See, e.g., Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1220 (N.M. 2008); Cash Am.
Int'l, Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 21 (Tex. 2000); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 513
(Ohio 1994); Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
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complete consideration of otherwise admissible evidence in the case.197
Without some adverse inference in the civil case, according to Fraser,
the defendant avoids any consequence stemming from that
deprivation,198 which results in a distorted and discordant balance
between the right to remain silent and the right of access that the Fifth
Amendment does not require.
C. Instructinga Civil Jury
How to instruct a jury or, indeed, whether to instruct a jury at all,
regarding the adverse inference raises a final consideration about the
effect of a Fifth Amendment objection in a civil case. In Florida, there
does not appear to be decisional guidance that addresses the propriety of
any specific civil jury instruction concerning a party's assertion of the
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify. 99 Courts throughout the
country have upheld a variety of instructions depending on the
circumstances. In several states, relatively terse instructions have been
allowed that simply inform the members of the jury that they may draw
an adverse or negative inference against the defendant if the defendant
(or, in some cases, the corporate defendant's employees or agents)
asserts his or her Fifth Amendment right.200 Other instructions have
been more nuanced, such as one upheld by the U.S. Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, where the trial court explained to the jury the constitutional
right of a witness to refuse to testify and then instructed the jury
members that they may, but need not, infer that the witness's answers
would have been adverse to his interests. 20 1 One Mississippi appellate
court, reviewing a wrongful death case where a non-party witness
refused to testify, upheld the trial court's instruction that the jury could
197. See Fraser v. Sec. & Inv. Corp., 615 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
198. Id.
199. See School Bd. of Orange County v. Coffey, 524 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988), which addresses one Florida court's civil jury instruction relating to a non-party
witness' assertion of the Fifth Amendment, but not in the context of whether his assertion could
create an adverse inference. The case involved a negligent retention and supervision claim
against a school board and superintendent regarding the employment of a teacher who sexually
abused a student. Id. Because the teacher's acts were apparently undisputed, the plaintiff was
not allowed to call the teacher as a witness before the jury solely for the purpose of having him
assert the Fifth Amendment. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's instruction to the
jury, which, from what the opinion reports, informed the jury that the court had precluded
counsel from asking the teacher about the specific instances based on the witness' constitutional
rights. Id.
200. See, e.g., Alderson v. Bonner, 132 P.3d 1261, 1272 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); Andrew
Corothers, M.D., P.C. v. Ins. Cos. Represented by Bruno, Gerbino & Soriano, LLP, 888
N.Y.S.2d 372, 382 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2009); Levine v. March, 266 S.W.3d 426, 442-44 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2007).
201. Rad Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1986).
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draw "whatever conclusion you believe proper" from the witness's
silence.2 0 2
Perhaps Florida's civil trial courts should exercise their own silence
on this point and heed the Supreme Court's warning about judicial
commentary on the Fifth Amendment in criminal cases: "What the jury
may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another." 203 Since civil litigants may remark on
their adversary's silence, it could be argued that one party's assertion of
the Fifth Amendment in a civil case simply falls under one of the
several factors regarding that witness's believability for the jury to
weigh in accordance with the standard civil jury instruction.2o Under
such a laissezfaire view, the fact that the objection was made becomes
relegated to the status of an other evidentiary fact for the jury's
deliberations on the evidence. 05 If the assertion truly holds the same
status as any other evidence, perhaps jurors ought to be free to apply the
fact that a witness has refused to testify however they see fit. The Fifth
Amendment objection might propel the entire verdict, or it might be
ignored completely, or its effect might lie somewhere in between these
two poles of persuasiveness.
On the other hand, failing to inform the jury of the adverse inference
that may be drawn from the defendant's silence arguably deprives the
plaintiff s case of the legal effect the courts have uniformly held may be
applied, in addition to depriving the plaintiff of the defendant's
testimony. It leaves the plaintiff in an unfair and unbalanced legal
position that Mitchell and Dixon indicate the inference could rectify. 06
202. Gibson v. Wright, 870 So. 2d 1250, 1260 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Another potential
issue that has not yet been addressed in any reported Florida decision involves the effect of a
defendant's assertion of the Fifth Amendment in response to requests for admission, a discovery
device which ordinarily requires some definitive response within thirty days of service, failing
which the requests are automatically deemed admitted. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.370. No compelling
reason comes to mind for treating a timely, properly asserted Fifth Amendment objection to a
request for admission any differently from how the same response to a question on examination
or an interrogatory would be treated. That is essentially the conclusion that was reached by two
courts in Maryland and Nebraska. See Kramer v. Levitt, 558 A.2d 760, 766-67 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1989); Wilson v. Misko, 508 N.W.2d 238, 253 (Neb. 1993). In both cases, the courts held
that the proper procedure would be to have the requests read into evidence, followed
immediately by the responding party's Fifth Amendment objection, followed then by an
explanation of the adverse legal inference that could be drawn from that objection. See Kramer,
558 A.2d at 766-67; Wilson, 508 N.W. 2d at 253.
203. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
204. See, e.g., FLA. STD. JURY INST. (Civ.) 601.2(a) (listing factors jury may consider
regarding the believability of any witness).
205. See, e.g., Rad Servs., 808 F.2d at 277; Alderson, 132 P.3d at 1272; Corothers, 888
N.Y. S.2d at 382; Levine, 266 S.W.3d at 442-44.
206. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999); Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
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The lack of a clear instruction also leaves the jurors with a difficult
puzzle to solve: how to consider, as they must, all of the factors of a
witness's believability, including his or her silence, without
impermissibly guessing what that witness's testimony might have
been. 207 This is a hard enough temptation for most people to avoid even
without the enticement of a self-incrimination objection. 208An
instruction along the lines of the Third Circuit's may be necessary, if
nothing else, to eliminate the potential for confusion and to fully
instruct the jury on the law when a party asserts his or her constitutional
right to remain silent in a civil trial. 209

VI.

CONCLUSION

Silence can mean many things. It can be benign or oppressive,
restful or restive, innocent or malevolent, depending on one's view and
temperament. It is seldom ignored; 210 certainly not in a civil lawsuit
when an individual, charged with allegations of wrongdoing and
demands for compensation, chooses silence over self-incrimination.
Claiming the right to remain silent in a civil case can make
something of an uproar throughout the course of the proceedings,
stirring procedural, evidentiary, equitable, and constitutional issues into
conflict, only a few of which have been touched upon in this Article. It
is these competing constitutional interests that need the closest attention
when the Fifth Amendment privilege is asserted during civil
proceedings because its assertion raises the stakes on both sides of the
dispute. A defendant's right to remain silent might mean effectively
closing the courthouse doors to a civil plaintiff before a hearing on the
merits is ever held. Conversely, protecting the plaintiffs right of access
to the courts and their procedures could very well mean inflicting
Dixon, 835 F.3d 554, 566 (5th Cir. 1987).
207. See, e.g., FLA. STD. JURY INST. (Civ) 601.1 ("You may draw reasonable inferences
from the evidence. But you should not guess about things that were not covered here.").
208. See Dale A. Nance, Adverse Inferences About Adverse Inferences: Restructuring
Judicial Roles for Responding to Evidence Tampering by Partiesto Litigation, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1089, 1102 (2010) (positing that "the juror who accepts the adverse inference argument may
well be imposing poetic justice, meaning a kind of justice that does not implement . . . the
niceties of proof. This poetic justice is achieved by adjusting the burden of persuasion")
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Cf Macias v. State, 515 So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla. 1987)
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting that, in a Fifth Amendment objection by the defendant against
providing a voice exemplar or performing field sobriety test during trial, the defendant may feel
compelled to explain the performance, or, if unable to perform at trial, to testify to avoid
speculation by the jury as to the reasons for the inability).
209. See Rad Servs., 808 F.3d at 277.
210. As Thoreau famously observed, silence is audible to all men. HENRY DAVID
THOREAU, JOURNAL OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU, vol. I, at 64 (1962).
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serious and tangible harm against the defendant who would exercise his
or her Fifth Amendment right. The constitutional implications of the
problem are, in truth, reciprocal.
Where, then, lies the line between unlawful compulsion against one
party's right to remain silent and infringement of another party's right
of access to the court? Drawing it inescapably involves a question of
judgment. 2 1 1 An elusive definition of what the right of access
necessarily entails, or pinpointing its source in federal jurisprudence,
makes the work no easier. But if a court fails to recognize the full
breadth of what is at issue when these interests collide in civil litigation,
any decision it renders will be imprecise. Striking the right balance
requires acknowledgment of both constitutional rights.

211.

McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002).
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